American Military Culture and
Civil-Military Relations Today
CHARLIE DUNLAP
Review of Rosa Brooks, How Everything Became War and the Military
Became Everything: Tales from the Pentagon (Simon & Schuster 2016)
If you’re like me, you may dread long
plane trips, not out of anxiety about flying,
but rather out of fear of being stuck next
to a loquacious but studiously uninformed
traveler. But if your seatmate happens to
be Rosa Brooks, you know you’re going to
have an interesting and thoughtful ride. If
you aren’t sure that’s going to happen
anytime soon, however, consider bringing
along her new book, How Everything
Became War and the Military Became
Everything: Tales from the Pentagon.
(Full disclosure, my friend Rosa—I’ll refer
to her in this review as Rosa, rather than
Professor Brooks—very kindly listed me in
her book’s acknowledgements.)

military detention, our strategic deafness
about Africa, stability operations, drones,
covert
operations,
cyber,
nonlethal
weapons, the militarization of foreign
policy, and much more.
The wide range of topics in How
Everything Became War is perhaps less for
its own sake than to point to the
interconnections between them, and also
to show the structure of national security
decision-making on a day-to-day basis and
the many offices of government and
officials — far beyond simply the
Department of Defense and a handful of
intelligence agencies — involved in
making them. These are weighty topics,
but the book proceeds in a deceptively
easy narrative tone, revealing Rosa’s
skill’s as a journalist. It opens, for
example, with an account of sitting in an
“anonymous Pentagon conference room …
listening as briefers from the military’s
Special Operations command went over
plans for an impending strike against a
terrorist operative.”

Though subtitled “Tales from the
Pentagon,” this book is not some sort of
mindless “tell-all” by a former government
official. Instead it’s a thoughtful analysis
of national security in a capacious sense,
as seen by a former journalist turned
Georgetown
law
professor
turned
Pentagon official turned defense thinker.
How Everything Became War is one of
those rare books in which there is no part
not worth reading; moreover, it addresses
an astonishing number of issues for a
volume of this length. You’ll learn about
such diverse security issues as piracy,

I say “deceptively easy” narrative, because
although How Everything Became War
often uses Rosa’s own experiences working
in the Pentagon for a little over two years
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— not, interestingly, as a practicing
lawyer, but instead as a senior advisor to
Under Secretary of Defense Michele
Flournoy — its point is not memoir as
such. Rather, Rosa uses her experiences,
set against her own self-described
background as the product of a family of
“left-wing antiwar activists” with many
prior assumptions about the US military,
to probe into the interior functioning of
the American national security apparatus
and American military culture.

mean. And that’s just within the national
security community of the executive
branch; the gaps in understanding and
trust are often even larger when extended
to the whole of government.
II
Although much of How Everything Became
War is about these “processes” internal to
the US national security community —
ways decisions are reached and policies
and actions taken — it also has many
interesting discussions about substantive
policies themselves. The development of
autonomous weapons is one, and it is
another area where I find myself in
violent agreement with the book. Arguing
that autonomous weapons might “be more
capable of behaving far more humanely
than we might assume” (and possibly
more humanely than humans in many
situations),
she
demonstrates
her
readiness to risk her street cred with the
human rights community with which she
has long been associated, and particularly
Human Rights Watch and associated
advocacy organizations’ “killer robots”
campaign calling for an outright ban on
these weapons.

As she says, the two years she spent in the
Pentagon were “strange, almost surreal in
their intensity” and she was simply too
busy while in the job to be able to
contemplate or analyze deeper questions
about the structure of America’s national
security institutions. That’s the point of
this book — to undertake the serious
analysis — and it might be thought of as
an exercise in "deep" journalism or
perhaps anthropology. Especially strong
are Rosa’s observations as to how and why
contemporary civil-military relations are
marred
by
mistrust
and
misunderstandings at the senior levels of
government, and how this plays out on a
day-to-day basis.
Her account of dealing with a civilian
counterpart on the National Security
Council, for example, who simply called up
one day asking — telling — the Pentagon
to shift a surveillance drone platform from
whatever it was doing for Central
Command, to monitor political events in
Kyrgyzstan bears reading in full (pp. 307311). The NSC staffer evidently thought
calling for shifting a surveillance drone
and its support was something akin to
ordering up a Big Mac; moreover, he
seemed not to understand that neither he
nor Rosa had the authority to order
Central Command to do this. Her
experience illustrates that there are
civilian officials who should (and need to)
know better — not only clueless as to how
the military works but also having a
skewed understanding of what “civilmilitary relations” really is supposed to

This is not to say that everyone will agree
with everything she has to say. I
disagreed with her on more than a few of
the issues. For example, she speaks
regretfully (as do many others) of not
being
able
to
close
Guantanamo.
Although I think the President ought to
have the authority to do so, I also believe
the evidence is scant that its closure
would markedly change anyone’s opinion
of the U.S. or alter terrorist behavior one
scintilla, and may even create a whole new
set of issues.
Apart from straight-up disagreement on
several issues, in some cases I found
myself disappointed with the onesidedness of her treatment of some topics.
Her hostility to drone warfare is one
example; it’s not that her arguments don’t
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have merit, but rather it’s the failure to
articulate the other side of the argument
with the same rigor. In fairness to the
book, however, it takes up so many topics
that I finally came to realize that it was
simply not possible for her to address
every aspect (to include all opposing views
and interpretations) of every issue. That
said, the reader needs to understand that
there
are
other
perspectives
and
interpretations.

(i.e., 2012), I said that the “one institution
of government in which the people
retained faith was the military. Buoyed
by the military’s obvious competence in
the First Gulf War, the public increasingly
turned to it for solutions to the country’s
problems.”
Fast forward from 1992 to 2016 and Rosa
says Americans view the military “as the
only reasonably well-functioning public
institution we have these days [and,] as a
result, Americans increasingly treat the
military as an all-purpose tool for fixing
anything that happens to be broken.”
True, but it would be an interesting
discussion to address that phenomenon
more broadly, as it so clearly predates
9/11. How Everything Became War also
makes, however, a number of critiques of
the U.S. military establishment. It offers a
catalogue of prescriptions to radically
change its organization; most of these are
proposals familiar to Lawfare readers as
they are frequent topics of discussion in
Washington think tanks.

How Everything Became War has one
theme, indicated by the book’s title, of
special importance in both civil-military
affairs and regarding American society
more broadly. This is her observation
(often made but given an especially
shrewd discussion in this book) that more
and more matters are being given to the
military to solve, even though it may not
be the best entity to attempt to do so or an
entity that even has the capability of
doing so. This handover, or desire to hand
tasks over, arises in no small part because
military is seemingly the only institution
of government left standing in the public
mind with any serious credibility.

While agreeing with much she has to say
regarding reform, I still would counsel
caution, given the current popularity just
noted of the military among Americans
(polls show the public has overwhelmingly
more confidence in it that any other entity
in our society), and the fact that virtually
all analysts believe it to be the world’s
strongest. It’s axiomatic that any change
in the existing formula that has produced
an institution so popular at home and so
respected
abroad
needs
powerful
justification to overcome the maxim of “if
it ain’t broke, don’t fix it.”

Several other reviews of this book have
appeared to take the view that this
phenomenon is a product of 9/11 and the
public embrace of the US military in the
years following. It seems unlikely that it
would have happened following 9/11 if
that public credibility had not grown in
earlier years. And in a 1991 seminal essay
in The Atlantic (“Military Efficiency”)
James Fallows mused on the many things
the military seemed able to accomplish
and said: “I’m beginning to think that the
only way to get the national government
to do anything worthwhile is to invent a
security threat and turn the job over to
the military.” This important aspect of
American civil-military affairs has a long
pedigree. Moreover, a journalist, justly
lauding Rosa’s book, reminded me of a
futuristic article I myself wrote in 1992
that was deeply influenced by Fallow’s
essay. In describing what I thought the
world would be like twenty years hence

III
Of course, even the best organizations
need to evolve, but change can produce
unintended, negative consequences. For
example, Rosa criticizes the military’s
fitness and age requirements as keeping
people with high-tech skills out of the
military. But in a nation of 310 million
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people, enlisting a fit, young, and skilled
cadre for the relatively small number of
people (less than 1% of population) the
military
requires
is
hardly
an
impossibility. The strategic costs — both
at home and abroad — of a force perceived
as unfit, aged, and potentially out-of-touch
could be very great. (Parenthetically, in
today’s combat theaters, every soldier can
find him or herself in a physicallydemanding situation, regardless of job
title.)

focus their practices narrowly, and take
years to acquire their special expertise;
few would say that an outsider could
practice competently via occasional forays,
even if endowed with a “partner”
appellation.)
Even more important are the intangibles
that can only be acquired by being part of
the armed forces themselves for an
extended period. It is easy for civilians to
think that military occupations are
interchangeable with a seemingly similar
job in civilian life. However, the eminent
military historian John Keegan (who,
though without military experience
himself, taught for years at the British
military academy Sandhurst) relates
something worth pondering, based on his
“life cast among warriors.” Soldiers, he
said,

She also suggests that the military ought
to send its “ten brightest young officers off
to Silicon Valley for a few years.”
Obviously, there could be benefits in
learning the ways of the byte barons. But
Silicon Valley is not only one of the
poshest and wealthiest places on the
planet, it’s also imbued with what one
writer calls a culture of “self-importance
and greed” — the very antipathy of the
values the military wants to inculcate into
its “brightest young officers.” On a more
practical level, how confident are we that
a soldier’s family (which so often dictates
whether a soldier stays or leaves the
military), having enjoyed the privileges
and luxuries of Silicon Valley life, will be
satisfied with the working-class environs
and the torrid summers of, say, a dusty
and remote (but inexplicably named) Ft.
Bliss, TX?

are not as other men … [that] lesson
has taught me to view with extreme
suspicion
all
theories
and
representations of war that equate it
with any other activity in human
affairs … Connection does not
amount to identity or even to
similarity …. War … must be fought
by men whose values and skills
[differ] … . They are those of a world
apart, a very ancient world, which
exists in parallel with the everyday
world but does not belong to it.

How Everything Became War further
contends that, since relatively few
positions in the military involve direct
combat, they could be filled — à la World
War II — with persons drawn from
civilian life, costumed in a uniform, and
awarded a rank that ordinarily requires
years to earn. One of the examples she
uses is that of a lawyer. Though this
might smack of special pleading, I would
suggest that the legal environment has
changed markedly since World War II,
and it takes a lot of time to fully
understand the intricacies and difficulties
of the “business” of this highly unusual
and unique “client.” (Indeed, the most
sophisticated civilian lawyers these days

One may argue whether lawyers and the
many others specialties Rosa believes are
readily substitutable with civilians are
“warriors,” but the real point is that in
order to be truly effective at these
putatively “civilian” endeavors within
military culture, one must embrace a “life
cast among warriors.” It really is that
simple. Apart from everything else, it is a
mistake for a civilian to think that a
military member, especially at the senior
levels, will usually — or, maybe, ever —
trust them as much as a fellow career
servicemember. The bond of shared
experience is real, and means much in the
military context.
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IV

Cold War was conducted with many hot
encounters and conflicts, fought through
proxy forces and using tools of covert
action and deliberately blurred conditions
of attribution, on both sides, in part
because both sides wished to avoid a
nuclear confrontation.

One of the great strengths of the book —
and the underpinning of its theme — is
her cogent tutorial on the evolution of
efforts to use law to “tame” war. She
includes in that account a discussion of
the role of military lawyers (she calls
them, affectionately — I think — “Boy
Scouts”) since 9/11. What was especially
revealing — intriguing — to me was the
degree of hostility some Bush-era civilian
lawyers evinced towards attorneys in
uniform, mainly, it seems, because those
military lawyers did not share the thenAdministration’s
views
on
certain
fundamental law of war and other issues.

The “peacetime” of the Cold War is
perhaps the norm that the present most
resembles,
including
not
just
transnational terrorists and non-state
armies, but also the re-entry of Russia
into the military history of the world —
and not in a good way. Perhaps, too, the
clean bright lines of the “binary” legal
conception should be considered as a
temporary construction made possible
during the golden years following the end
of the Cold War and collapse of the Soviet
Union, in which international great power
struggles were muted under the umbrella
of U.S. power. If so, then some form of the
“hybrid” legal regime that Rosa proposes
is not so much as novelty as a reversion to
the historical mean of just how messy
ordinary “peace” can be.

How Everything Became War's central
premise here is that, historically, the
human condition has typically been a
binary state, that is, at either war or
peace. This circumstance, Rosa contends,
is fundamentally different today because
of the rise of potent non-state belligerents
and technology-empowered terrorists. She
makes the not-implausible argument that
since today we live in a world that is not
quite peace and not quite war, current law
is inadequate, because it grounded in an
unrealistic binary. She contends that
today nations seek
to implement
mechanistically either the peacetime legal
regime or the war convention, despite the
fact that neither paradigm quite applies to
contemporary reality. This leads her to
advocate some sort of new, hybrid set of
laws to address this blurriness.

And in any case, the law of war is itself
evolutionary. The International Military
Tribunal at Nuremberg concluded that the
“law is not static, but by continual
adaption follows the needs of a changing
world.” True today? Consider how quickly
the international community has gone
from eschewing attacks against economic
targets to virtually carpet bombing
Islamic State oil fields. Cyber? We now
have the Tallinn Manual — which is a
testament to the feasibility of applying
existing law to new technology. (And
Tallinn 2.0 is on the way.)

I suspect that military historians will take
issue with her proposal, as there are
plenty of examples of conflicts that
involved irregular fighter, terrorists, and
exploitative criminals. There has always
been a mixture of threats and enemy
capabilities. The history of armed
engagements, small or large, involving
U.S. military forces over the past, say, 100
years shows, if anything, that small-scale
engagements and uses of military force or
its threat are long-running features of the
American experience of “peacetime.” The

V
How Everything Became War also seems
to believe that the law of war paradigm
has come at the cost of human rights.
Putting aside what occurred in the
aftermath of 9/11, the fact is that today
military operations, at least as conducted
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by the US and its allies, are far more
constrained than the law of war would
permit. Indeed, if there is a criticism to be
leveled (and both Presidential candidates
seem to have done so), it’s that the air war
against the Islamic State has not been
prosecuted to the fullest extent that the
law would permit. The real human rights
and moral issue today is not tooaggressive military action on the part of
the US and its allies, but rather policydriven inaction.

York) found that only 32% of Americans
thought that the government’s antiterrorism policies “have gone too far in
restricting the average person’s civil
liberties” while a whopping 53% believe
“they have not gone far enough to
adequately protect the country.” As
terrorist incidents persist, any attempt to
adjust the domestic legal framework may
end with something much at odds with
what Rosa and the human rights-centered
community would seem to want.

In addition to the international legal
scene, a major portion of the book is spent
enumerating what Rosa sees as flaws in a
domestic legal scheme that, in her opinion,
yields too often to the perceived needs of
security. Her criticisms generally (but not
always) track those of privacy advocates,
human rights organizations, and left-ofcenter progressives. Her perspective in
this area is unapologetically one of an
advocate, not a dispassionate elucidator of
opposing sides. That understood, is she
right that we need real change in both
international and domestic law?

Frankly, it also isn’t clear to me that
creating in essence a third legal regime,
either international or domestically, will
result in the clarity and simplicity Rosa
desires, at least not if it’s supposed to be a
genuinely new kind of law and not simply
a return, especially in international law,
to the ways states have actually
understood things and acted and regarded
as lawful under existing paradigms of law.
The problem with the binary legal view —
including thinking that it creates
problems that require solving through a
genuinely new legal paradigm — is that
the law was never cleanly binary in the
first place.

A guarded “maybe” is all I can muster.
Caution
is
(again)
merited,
as
international law regulating conflict is
already under stress. Moreover, almost
every initiative for change — largely
coming from the human rights community
— is aimed at further endowing non-state
actors with additional legal rights and
privileges (despite their utter contempt for
the law), rather than enhancing the
ability of states to protect their citizenry,
as that citizenry seems to want. We need
to be very careful not to reinforce the
notion that the law is drifting into
seeming impotence and irrelevance — not
just from newly empowered non-state
actors, but also from rising or re-emerging
Great Powers as, for example, Russia
conducts an air war in Aleppo that one
might be forgiven for mistaking to be a
World War II leveling of cities.

And more law doesn’t necessary produce
better solutions. “Grey area” cases will
continue to arise, and their resolution will
always be fact-specific. Is it hard to divine
the applicable law and to apply it
appropriately
in
many
(most?)
circumstances? Of course, but that’s what
lawyers do. And let’s keep in mind that in
a high-technology era, there are many
extraordinarily
complicated
security
tasks, so lawyers shouldn’t feel themselves
entitled to exemption from the problems of
complexity and blurred lines.
Taken as a whole, it’s pretty clear that
Rosa wants to start a much-needed
dialogue with How Everything Became
War and not necessarily to definitively
resolve each concern raised. Indeed, a
central purpose of the book seems to be to
alert the reader to the very fact that the
issues exist and provide some context to

Domestic law? Let’s not forget that a very
recent poll (before the bombings in New
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think about them. I could easily envision
this book being a platform for a graduate
or law school seminar where students
were assigned to critique (or confirm) the
matters she raises.

listening.” And, really, isn’t that what the
best airplane seat partners — er, books —
do?
Charlie Dunlap is a retired Air Force
major general who is currently a Professor
of the Practice of Law, and Executive
Director of the Center on Law, Ethics and
National Security at Duke Law School.

How Everything Became War could hardly
be richer in raising critically important
issues; it’s a must-read conversationstarter par excellence. What makes it
especially engaging is Rosa’s constructive
tenor and tone. It isn’t dictatorial or
condescending as so many of the books of
this genre tend to be. Rather, when you
come to the end, it’s almost as if she turns
to you — sitting side by side in your
airplane seats — and says, “Ok, that’s
what I think; what do you think? I’m
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